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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I .

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an administrative driver's license suspension case.

Raymond Scott Peck (herein "Peck" or "Appellant") appeals from
the decision of the Idaho Department of Transportation in the
Findings of Fact And Conclusions of Law and Order entered January
8, 2010 suspending Peck's driver's license and from the decisions
of the District Court in the Decision On Appeal, entered
September 28, 2010, and in the Order On Petition For Rehearing,
entered on December 28, 2010, upholding the suspension of Peck's
driver's license.

II.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On or about January 8, 2010, the Idaho Transportation

Department entered its Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law
And Order sustaining a Notice of Suspension served upon Peck
pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002A by a City of Sandpoint Police
Officer on December 2, 2009. R. Pgs. 8-20.

Peck filed his

Petition For Judicial Review And Ex Parte Application For Stay Of
Agency Decision on January 14, 2010 with the District Court.

R.

Pgs. 4-20.
Following briefing and oral argument, the District Court
issued its Decision On Appeal on September 28, 2010 upholding the
suspension.

R. Pgs. 63-76.

Following a petition for rehearing,

etc. and a response and oral argument, the District Court issued
its Order On Petition For Rehearing on December 28, 2010,
upholding the suspension. R. Pgs. 87-95.
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This appeal follows.

III. CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant Raymond Scott Peck is a resident of Bonner
County, Idaho.

On December 2, 2009, Peck turned left from the

business known as the Wily Widgeon driveway onto Highway 200.
Peck traveled on Highway 200 to the intersection with US 95, and
continued traveling southbound on US 95.
traveled exceeded 600 feet in length.

The distance Peck

Sandpoint Police Officer

Nolan Crossley initiated a traffic stop upon Peck for traveling 45
miles per hour prior to the North Information Center on US 95.
There are no structures along the highway for the entire distance
traveled by Peck prior to the stop being initiated.

December 29,

2009 Transcript, Pgs. 3-5.
During the traffic stop, Peck did not complete any field
sobriety tests.

At the station, while in custody, following the

first 15 minute observation period, Peck submitted to the breath
test, with an invalid result.

A second 15 minute observation

period was commenced, during which time Peck opened his mouth and
belched, and also patted or tapped on his chest with his fist, all
in the presence of the officer.
observation period was commenced.

No additional or new 15 minute
Less than one minute elapsed

between the time of the belch and the breath testing conducted.
The breach test results were .083/.086.

December 29, 2009

Transcript, Pgs. 5-7.
Peck was cited by SPD Citation No. 41744 with a violation of
"Excess of Max Speed Limit 49-654(2) 45 mph in posted 35 mph
zone," which is the basis for the stop resulting in the request
for blood alcohol content (BAC) testing.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
The Appellant Peck's statement of the issues on appeal is as
follows:
(a)

Was the hearing properly noticed and held pursuant to

statute?
(b)

Was the Petitioner fully informed of the consequences

of testing so as to conform to due process?
(c)

Is the Affidavit so lacking as to be not credible?

(d)

Did probable cause grounds exist for the stop?

(e)

Were the BAC test results obtained in conformance with

the testing procedures?

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
The Appellant Peck seeks to keep alive the possibility of an
award attorney fees on appeal against the Respondent State of
Idaho, Department Of Transportation pursuant to Idaho Code § 12117, if then applicable.
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ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
I.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE SUSPENSION OF A PERSON'S
DRIVER'S LICENSE
The standard of review for a decision by the State of Idaho,

Department of Transportation to suspend a person's driver's
license was recently reiterated by the Idaho Court of Appeals in
Bennett v. State, Dept. of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 142-43,206
P.3d 50S, 506-07 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009), as follows:
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (I.D.A.P.A.)
governs the review of department decisions to deny, cancel,
suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's driver's
license. See I.C. §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270. In
an appeal from the decision of the district court acting in
its appellate capacity under I.D.A.P.A., this Court reviews
the agency record independently of the district court's
decision. Marsha~~ v. Idaho Dep't or Transp., 137 Idaho 337,
340, 48 P.3d 666, 669 (Ct.App.2002). This Court does not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1);
Marsha~~, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This Court
instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Cor.p., 130
Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); Marsha~~, 137
Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's
factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court,
even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency,
so long as the determinations are supported by substantial
competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. B~aine County,
ex re~. Bd. or Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742
(2000); Marsha~~, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate
statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful
procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the
agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a
manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial
*143 **507 right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v.
Payette County Bd. or County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429,
958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998); Marsha~~, 137 Idaho at 340, 48
P.3d at 669. If the agency's decision is not affirmed on
appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and remanded for further
proceedings as necessary." I.C. § 67-5279(3).
The administrative license suspension (ALS) statute,
I.C. § 18-8002A, requires that the lTD suspend the driver's
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 4

license of a driver who has failed a BAC test administered
by a law enforcement officer. The period of suspension is
ninety days for a driver's first failure of an evidentiary
test and one year for any subsequent test failure within
five years. I.C. § lS-S002A(4) (a). A person who has been
notified of an ALS may request a hearing before a hearing
officer designated by the lTD to contest the suspension.
I.C. § lS-S002A(7). At the administrative hearing, the
burden of proof rests upon the driver to prove any of the
grounds to vacate the suspension. I.C. § lS-S002A(7); Kane
v. State, Dep't ox Transp., 139 Idaho 5S6, 590, S3 P.3d 130,
134 (Ct.App.2003). The hearing officer must uphold the
suspension unless he or she finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the driver has shown one of several grounds
enumerated in I.C. § lS-S002A(7) for vacating the
suspension. Those grounds include:
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop
the person; or
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the
person had been driving or was in actual physical
control of a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in
violation of the provisions of section lS-S004, lSS004C or lS-S006, Idaho Code; or
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol
concentration or the presence of drugs or other
intoxicating substances in violation of section lSS004, lS-8004C or lS-S006, Idaho Code; or
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other
intoxicating substances administered at the direction
of the peace officer were not conducted in accordance
with the requirements of section lS-S004(4) , Idaho
Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning
properly when the test was administered; or
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of
submitting to evidentiary testing as required in
subsection (2) of this section.
I.C.
§
lS-S002A(7). The hearing officer's decision is
subject to challenge through a petition for judicial review.
I.C. § lS-S002A(S); Kane, 139 Idaho at 5S9, S3 P.3d at 133.
II.

THE LICENSE SUSPENSION HEARING WAS NOT HELD PURSUANT TO THE
REQUIRED STATUTORY NOTICE
Idaho Code § lS-S002A(7) Administrative hearing on

suspension, provides in relevant part as follows:
A person who has been served with a notice of
suspension after submitting to an evidentiary test may
request an administrative hearing on the suspension before a
hearing officer designated by the department. The request
for hearing shall be in writing and must be received by the
department within seven (7) calendar days of the date of
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 5

service upon the person of the notice of suspension, and
shall include what issue or issues shall be raised at the
hearing. The date on which the hearing request was received
shall be noted on the face of the request.
If a hearing is requested, the hearing shall be held
within twenty (20) days of the date the hearing request was
received by the department unless this period is, for good
cause shown, extended by the hearing officer for one ten
(10) day period. Such extension shall not operate as a stay
of the suspension, notwithstanding an extension of the
hearing date beyond such thirty (30) day period. Written
notice of the date and time of the hearing shall be sent to
the party requesting the hearing at least seven (7) days
prior to the scheduled hearing date. The department may
conduct all hearings by telephone if each participant in the
hearing has an opportunity to participate in the entire
proceeding while i t is taking place.

***
Peck's request for hearing was timely made on December 8,
2009 (Agency R., pgs 13-14).

The State of Idaho, Department of

Transportation (herein "lTD") issued several notices thereafter.
On December 15, 2009, the lTD first issued by u.S. Mail its Notice
Of Telephonic Hearing (Agency R., pg 20) setting December 29, 2009
as the hearing date with hearing officer Mark Richmond, and then
issued by u.S. Mail its Show Cause Letter (Agency R., pg 21)
citing a conflict with hearing officer Mark Richmond's schedule to
justify an extension beyond the required 20 day statutory deadline
request, within a single 10 day statutory extension.
On December 18, 2009, the lTD first issued by fax at 2:19
p.m. its Notice of Telephonic Hearing (Agency R., pgs 22-23)
changing the date to December 9, 2009 and changing the hearing
officer to Eric Moody, and then issued by fax at 3:40 p.m. its
Show Cause Letter (Agency R., pgs 24-25) citing a change of the
designated hearing officer.
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The telephonic hearing was conducted on December 29, 2009 by
the State of Idaho, Department Of Transportation with Hearing
Officer Eric Moody, not on the date of December 9, 2009 that was
scheduled for the hearing and beyond the 20 day statutory deadline
for holding such hearing.

The Notice of Telephonic Hearing and

Show Cause Letter, each dated December 15, 2009 (Agency R., pgs
20-21) provided for hearing officer Mark Richmond and a hearing
date of December 29, 2009.

The Notice of Telephonic Hearing and

Show Cause Letter, each dated December lS, 2009 (Agency R., pgs
22-25) provided for the hearing to be December 9, 2009 before
hearing officer Eric Moody.

The hearing was not conducted

pursuant to the noticed date of December 9, 2009, nor was the
hearing held in compliance with the statutory time limits of Idaho
Code lS-S002A.
The December lS, 2009 Notices changed both the hearing
officer and the hearing date.

In addition, once the hearing

officer was changed to Eric Moody, there was not a show cause
letter or assertion to exceed the 20 day hearing deadline in Idaho
Code lS-S002A(7).

The basis for the December 29 hearing date was

that the hearing officer Mark Richmond had a scheduling conflict.
There is nothing in the record to support holding the hearing on
December 29 and there is nothing in the record to exceed the 20
day period for hearing officer Eric Moody.

The hearing was held

on a then unnoticed date of December 29, 2009.

The hearing was

not noticed nor held in compliance with the statutory provisions
of Idaho Code lS-S002A.

Thus, the decision upholding the license

suspension should be vacated as the agency's decision (a)
violated statutory or constitutional provisions;
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 7

(b) exceed the

agency's statutory authority; and/or (c) was made upon unlawful
procedure.

III. THE NECESSARY ADVICE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BREATH
TESTING WAS LACKING, RESULTING IN NO IMPLIED CONSENT AND A
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
Idaho Code § 49-335(2) provides that "[a]ny person who
operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A, B or C
driver's license is disqualified from operating a commercial
vehicle for a period of not less that one (1) year if the person
refuses to submit to or submits to and fails a test to determine
the driver's alcohol, drug or other intoxicating substances
concentration while operating a motor vehicle."

The Notice of

Suspension form served upon Peck (Agency R., pgs 1-2) fails to
satisfy the notice requirements of Idaho Code and of due process,
as it fails to give notice of the provisions and consequences of
Idaho Code § 49-335(2).

As in the circumstances of Wanner v.

State, Dept. of Transp., 150 Idaho 164,244 P.3d 1250, 1252
(2011), the Notice does " ... not address the situation presented
by the underlying facts of this case: the consequences of
refusing or failing evidentiary testing for the holder of a CDL
who was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of contact
with law enforcement. This is significant because I.C. § 49335(2) provides that a motorist who fails evidentiary testing is
disqualified from operating a commercial vehicle for not less
than one year."
The Idaho statutes for alcohol testing in Idaho Code §§ 188002 and 18-8002A are based upon implied consent.

The statutory

fiction of implied consent is conditioned upon notice of the
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 8

consequences being given to the driver immediately prior to the
testing.

Without proper notice, the driver has not given implied

consent and the license cannot be suspended.
Evidentiary testing for blood alcohol is a seizure of the
person and a search for evidence.

Pursuant to the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, Peck has a
substantial right to be free of search or seizure.
Cooper, 39 P.3d 637, 136 Idaho 697 (2001).

See State v.

In order to have a

search and seizure, a driver'S informed or implied consent must be
based upon an accurate advice of the consequences.

Here there is

no advice given prior to the request for testing that a person's
CDL privileges are impacted differently than the other driving
privileges in the advisory (one year as opposed to 90 days).
such there is not sufficient advice.

As

The legal rational and

analysis is the same as if the consequences of the "standard"
advisory form were not read to the driver at all.

The outcome is

the same on the advisory form's advice whether given or not: take
the test and fail OR refuse the test and the driver faces the same
suspension result.

There is no basis to uphold a suspension if

the results of the decision are the same.
the opposite.

The case law is exactly

The law requires the advice to be given to the

driver to "validate" the implied or informed consent.
As explained in Matter of Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 947, 895
P.2d 182, 183 (Idaho App. 1995), "Idaho law requires strict
adherence to the statutory language ... " which provides notice.
Further, a driver's license is to be reinstated if the driver is
"not completely advised of his rights and duties."

Matter of

Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 947, 895 P.2d 182, 183 (Idaho App. 1995)
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9

citing Matter of Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 370, 744 P.2d 92, 98
(1987).

Also, as set forth in Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829,

833-834, 41 P.3d 257, 261 - 262 (Idaho 2002) the warrantless
search exception is based upon the implied consent.

Implied

consent requires notice of one's rights and the consequences.

As

no notice is given of the disqualification provisions of Idaho
Code § 49-335(2), there is no implied and no informed consent.
Thus without being informed of the statutory provision, the
testing is not upon consent, and violates due process.

The

hearing officer's decision should be vacated as i t (a) violates
statutory or constitutional provisions;
statutory authority;

(b) exceeds the agency's

(c) is made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) is

not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) is
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

IV.

THE AFFIDAVIT AND TEST RESULTS ARE LACKING TO SUPPORT
SUSPENSION
The Affidavit and test results used to sustain the

suspension (Agency R., pgs 3-8) are defective in that the
documents fail to identify the alleged acts as occurring in the
State of Idaho, indicate Sim. Check No. 0008 and 0009 having
variations of .005, and show the officer's statements in the
narrative directly contrary to the officer's statements in the
check the box portions of affidavit.

The affidavit fails to

identify the State of Idaho as the location of the contact.

This

same affidavit asserts in the narrative that certain tests were
not administered, but in the check the box portion asserts the
tests were given and failed.
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Taken as a whole, the credibility of the affidavit and test
results are lacking on their face.

This argument is not that

there are technical defects or lacking defects in the
Department's documentation, but rather credibility is lacking to
support the alleged facts and/or suspension.

Thus the decision

should be vacated as i t (d) is not supported by substantial
evidence in the record; or (e) is arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion.

V.

THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE GROUNDS FOR THE STOP

The Affidavit used to sustain the suspension (Agency R., pgs
5-8) and the traffic citation No. 41744 asserts the basis for the
stop as traveling 45 mph in a posted 35 mph zone, with visual
estimation and radar indicating 45 mph, in violation of Idaho
Code § 49-654(2).
Idaho Code § 49-654(2) contains two provisions for 35 mile
per hour speed zones, specifically in subparagraphs (a) and (b),
as follows:
(a)

Thirty-five (35) miles per hour or a lesser maximum
speed adopted pursuant to section 49-207(2) (a), Idaho
Code, in any residential, business, or urban district.

(b)

Thirty-five (35) miles per hour in any urban district.

Idaho Code § 49-105(11) provides the definition for district
as follows: "District" means:
(a)

Business district. The territory contiguous to and
including a highway when within any six hundred (600)
feet along the highway there are buildings in use for
business or industrial purposes, including hotels,
banks or office buildings, railroad stations and public
buildings which occupy at least three hundred (300)
feet of frontage on one side or three hundred (300)
feet collectively on both sides of the highway.
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(b)

Residential district. The territory contiguous to and
including a highway not comprising a business district
when the property on the highway for a distance of
three hundred (300) feet or more is in the main
improved with residences, or residences and buildings
in use for business.

(c)

Urban district. The territory contiguous to and
including any highway which is built up with structures
devoted to business, industry or dwelling houses. For
purposes of establishing speed limits in accordance
with the provisions of section 49-654, Idaho Code, no
state highway or any portion thereof lying within the
boundaries of an urban district is subject to the
limitations which otherwise apply to nonstate highways
within an urban district. Provided, this subsection
shall not limit the authority of the duly elected
officials of an incorporated city acting as a local
authority to decrease speed limits on state highways
passing through any district within the incorporated
city.

There is no testimony or evidence in the record by the
Officer other than the general assertion of a posted speed limit
of 35 mph.

There is no factual statement of any specific sign or

any specific posting of a speed limit.

There is no testimony or

evidence in the record by the Officer or otherwise, as to the
speed zone, and the uncontroverted testimony of Peck is that
there were no buildings or structures occupying the sides of the
highway necessary to meet the statutory definition of business
district, residential district, or urban district.

There were no

structures or buildings in use for business or industrial
purposes, including hotels, banks or office buildings, railroad
stations and public buildings (Business District).

There were no

structures or buildings in the main improved with residences, or
residences and buildings in use for business (Residential
District).

There were no structures or buildings built up with

structures devoted to business, industry or dwelling houses
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(Urban District).

Therefore, the speed limit on Highway 200 and

US 95 in the location of the contact is controlled by Idaho Code
§ 49-654(2) (d) providing for a limit of 65 miles per hour.
When presented with the uncontroverted facts and argument,
the hearing examiner concluded in the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order entered the 8 th day of January, 2010
Agency Record, pages 49-50, that " ... i t is assumed this area of
highway met the requirements of Idaho Code §49-654(2) (a) and/or
(b) even though there are no structures or buildings in the area
prior to Peck being stopped."

The hearing examiner cannot

"assume" matters not in the record, and which are contrary to the
statutory basis for the stop, and/or which are controverted by
specific uncontested testimony of the Petitioner.

See Bennett v.

lTD, 147 Idaho 141 (Id.Ct.App. 2009), discussed in further detail
below.
Peck's argument can be summarized as follows: The statutorily
defined District sets the applicable speed limit. A speed limit
sign posted contrary to the statute is of no effect. The posting
is void and ultra vires.

In other words, the sign does not

control the speed limit; rather the statutory definitions and
provisions define the speed limit.
law, is of no effect.

A sign posted contrary to the

As described in Dabestani v. Bellus, 131

Idaho 542, 549, 961 P.2d 633, 638-640 (1998), a posted speed
limit sign not in conformance with the actual speed limit is of
no force and effect.
It cannot be presumed or even assumed that a posted speed
limit sign controls what statutory District exists.

If this were

the case, the statutes would simply provide for all speed limits
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to be set by posting, not by District definition.

The posting

must comply with the District, as defined by statute, to be valid
and enforceable.
The lTD has argued that a city can lower the 45 mile per hour
speed within the Urban District pursuant to Idaho Code 49105(11(c).

In order for this provision to be applicable, Peck

would have had to have been in an Urban District (and proof of a
city acting would be necessary).

As irrefutably established by

the evidence, the portion of the highway upon which Peck was
traveling, was NOT in an Urban District.

Therefore, it is

irrelevant if an incorporated city acted or not, because an
incorporated city only has authority to act in the Urban District,
not outside of an Urban District.
The lTD and its hearing officer cannot "assume" matters not
in the record and contrary to the statutory scheme establishing
speed limits.

Thus, the hearing officer's finding that probable

cause grounds existed for the stop is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole and the decision
should be vacated.

VI.

THE HAC TESTS ARE INVALID AS THE TESTING DID NOT MEET THE
APPLICABLE PROCEDURES
Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), the Idaho State Police

("ISP") are charged with promulgating standards for administering
tests for breath alcohol content and the ISP has issued operating
manuals establishing procedures for the maintenance and operation
of breath test equipment.
656, 659,

Pursuant to In Re Mahurin, 140 Idaho

(Idaho App. 2004), noncompliance with the maintenance
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and operation procedures is a ground for vacating an
administrative license suspension under I.C. § 18-8002A(7) (d).
As set forth in State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 453 (Idaho App.
1999) and Bennett v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 147 Idaho
141, 144-145 (Idaho App. 2009), the pertinent portion of the
manual instructs:
Observe the subject for 15 minutes. During this time, the
subject may not smoke, consume alcohol, belch, vomit, use
chewing tobacco, or have any other substance in the mouth.
If belching or vomiting does occur or something is found in
the mouth, wait an additional 15 minutes.
Peck testified that he belched during the monitoring period,
less than a minute before taking the breath test.

The fact of

the audible belch and physical actions accompanying the audible
belch are not controverted.

The monitoring period is required in

order to rule out the possibility that alcohol or other
substances have been introduced into the subject's mouth from the
outside or by belching or regurgitation. Carson, 133 Idaho at
453.

Only the officer's probable cause affidavit was submitted

to the record in support of the suspension.

The officer's form

affidavit provides only generalized statements regarding
employment of proper procedures. Peck presented uncontroverted
specific facts of the belch.
Peck met his burden to prove grounds to vacate the
suspension of his license, as he testified to the belch.

The

hearing officer did not find Peck's testimony to lack credibility
and in fact had no basis upon which to find.

When presented with

the uncontroverted specific facts and argument, the hearing
examiner concluded in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Order entered the 8~ day of January, 2010 (R. page 51) that
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the test was performed in compliance with the standards.

Peck's

testimony demonstrates that proper monitoring procedures were not
followed, and that the test for alcohol concentration was,
therefore, not conducted in accordance with the requirements of
I.C. § 18-8004(4).

The officer's general, non-specific affidavit

is insufficient to support a finding when compared to the
credible evidence of Peck that demonstrates a violation of proper
procedures.

See generally Bennett v. Idaho Dept. of

Transportation, 147 Idaho 141, 144-145 (Idaho App. 2009).

Thus,

the hearing officer's finding that the breath test was conducted
in compliance with procedural standards is directly contrary to
the Bennett holding.
There is no means by which to distinguish the Bennett case
and holding from this matter.

In Bennett v. Idaho Dept. of

Transportation, 147 Idaho 141, 144-145 (Idaho App. 2009), the
officer's affidavit asserted general compliance with the testing
procedures (which would include that he was present to observe
during the observation period).

In this circumstance the

officer's affidavit likewise asserts general compliance with the
testing procedures (which would include that he did not observe
any belch).

In Bennett, the specific testimony was that the

officer did not observe during the entire observation period.

In

this circumstance, the specific testimony by Peck is that the
officer did observe a belch during the observation period.

The

facts and the holding of Bennett fall squarely in line with the
pending issue. The hearing officer did not have any credible
specific evidence from the officer's general affidavit that Peck
did not belch to refute the specific testimony of Peck.
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Peck's testimony demonstrates that proper monitoring
procedures were not followed, and that the test for alcohol
concentration was, therefore, not conducted in accordance with
the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4).

There was no specific

conflicting evidence presented by the hearing officer.

Thus, the

hearing officer's finding that the breath test was conducted in
compliance with procedural standards is directly contrary to the
Bennett holding, and is not supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole.

The decision should therefore be vacated.

VII. IS IDAHO CODE § 12-117 AGAIN APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Notwithstanding the most recent rounds of appellate Court
interpretation and legislative amendments to Idaho Code § 12-117,
Peck seeks to maintain the possibility to recover attorney fees
against the State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, pursuant
to Idaho Code § 12-117, which governs the award of attorney fees
in proceedings between persons and state agencies.
When applicable to a proceeding, Idaho Code § 12-117 is not a
discretionary statute.

It provides that the court

sha~~

award

attorney fees upon a finding that the state agency did not act
with a reasonable basis in fact or law.

Idaho Dept. of Law

Enforcement v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 685 (1994).

The policy

behind I.C. § 12-117 is: "1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless
or arbitrary agency action; and 2) to provide a remedy for persons
who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending
against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes
agencies never should ha[ve] made." Id.,

(quoting Bogner v. State

Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859 (1984».
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Here, the Department's hearing officer's decision has no
basis in law or fact to uphold the Peck's suspension.

The hearing

officer cannot ignore credible, specific, and uncontroverted
evidence or make conclusions directly contrary to law.

The

conduct invokes both purposes of the statutory policy, and
attorney fees should be awarded to the Peck to discourage such
conduct and to allow recovery for the unjustified financial burden
placed on the Peck by the hearing officer's erroneous decision.

CONCLUSION
As set forth above, for any of the several grounds asserted,
the decision of the Hearing Examiner sustaining the Notice of
Suspension should be vacated, as well as the District Court's
decisions sustaining the suspension.

The relief sought is to

reverse the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Order by
denying and/or vacating the suspension of the Peck's driving
privileges, to reinstate the driving privileges, and if
applicable, for an award to Peck of attorney fees and costs
against the Respondent.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

{

day of July, 2011.

FINNEY, P.A.
Attorney for Appellant PECK
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